4. Global Reader and Path Review¶
Authenticate as the target principal¶
Convert the recovered PKCS#12 material into the certificate and private-key format required by the authentication workflow demonstrated by the instructor. Authenticate using:
- the workshop tenant ID;
- the application/client ID for
svc-global-reader; and - the recovered client certificate and private key.
Confirm that the new token represents svc-global-reader. It must not
represent either guest account or the diagnostics VM managed identity.
Validate the objective¶
Use a read-only Microsoft Graph request from the workshop workflow to verify
that the principal can perform an operation allowed by its tenant-wide
Global Reader directory role. Confirm the active tenant before making the
request and do not make directory changes.
Final checkpoint
The technical objective is complete when authentication occurs as
svc-global-reader, its Global Reader assignment is visible, and an
expected read-only operation succeeds in the authorized tenant.
Reconstruct the complete path¶
Use your Cirro graph and collected evidence to explain every transition:
Public signup
-> guest identity
-> dynamic group membership
-> subscription Reader
-> exposed diagnostics VM
-> command execution
-> VM managed identity
-> Key Vault data-plane access
-> client certificate
-> svc-global-reader
-> Global Reader
Create a final Attack Path tab in CirroDash. Add:
- a table card containing the complete path query used in the workshop;
- a count card for the number of distinct identities in the path; and
- a table card listing each relationship type in traversal order.
Test each query, keep the results limited to the authorized scenario, and use clear column aliases so another analyst can understand the evidence without editing the query.
For each edge, record the evidence that proves it and the control that would break it. Your remediation discussion should address account creation, dynamic membership, broad resource visibility, public workload exposure, command construction, managed-identity permissions, privileged credential storage, and exportable certificates.
Path review
Which single control change would most reliably break the path? Which additional changes provide defense in depth if that control fails?